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INTRODUCTION
The cornerstone of the American patent law system is to
encourage technological innovation by financially rewarding
1
inventors for the full disclosure of their ideas. By enacting Article I,
Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution, the Framers envisioned a
2
system that “promote[s] the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”
The astounding advancements in many areas of technology show that
their vision became a reality. With these few words, Congress faced
the challenging task of establishing a system that encourages
ingenuity and rewards innovation, while conferring a useful benefit
to society as a whole.
Over two hundred years later, patent legislation has evolved into
a complex, carefully constructed statutory scheme that is
indispensable for sustaining research efforts in both the public and
3
private sectors.
To maintain integrity in the system, Congress
∗

J.D. Candidate, 2003, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A. Molecular
Biology/Biochemistry and History, 1997, Rutgers College.
1
DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 1 (2001). The actual right
awarded to a patent holder is the right to exclude others from “making, using,
offering for sale, or selling the invention” in the United States. See infra text
accompanying note 97. This in turn often results in financial gain through the
licensing or assignment of these rights to others. See generally CHISUM, supra, at 2-6;
see also Kevin C. Hooper, Utility and Non-operability Standards in Biotechnology Patent
Prosecution: CAFC Precedent Versus PTO Practice, 36 IDEA 203, 206 (1996) (“In theory,
[the patent system] . . . is a quid pro quo method used by the government to
encourage early and complete disclosure of inventions that meet the statutory
criteria for patentability.”).
2
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
3
See Hooper, supra note 1, at 203-04 (explaining that patent protection is an
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developed requirements that an invention must satisfy in order to
4
receive patent protection. In particular, the invention must be
5
6
7
novel, nonobvious, and useful. As patent law attempts to keep pace
with rapid developments in technology, the meaning of these
seemingly simple concepts is often imbued with uncertainty.
8
The Human Genome Project, for example, reveals valuable
information about genes that are involved in life-threatening diseases
and other genetic disorders. Such a database of information is fertile
ground for raising highly complex patent law issues. Private and
public entities are already taking advantage of this information by
9
filing patent applications for full or partial length gene sequences.
10
In response, the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) recently
issued new Utility Examination Guidelines (“Guidelines”) that
purport to aid Examiners as they review applications claiming gene
11
sequences.
Under these new Guidelines, the claimed invention
12
must have “specific, substantial, and credible” utility. The reasoning
behind issuing the new Guidelines is clear—to ensure patents are not
important factor toward the ultimate success in the biotechnology industry, because
most companies cannot afford the monetary risks required to develop commercially
useful products without such protection). Furthermore, patent protection is also
critical to secure investments from venture capitalists in order to create start-up
companies that develop promising technologies in the market place. Id. at 205.
4
An invention must satisfy several requirements in order to be deemed
patentable. See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03, 112 (1994); see also Nathan Machin,
Prospective Utility: A New Interpretation of the Utility Requirement of Section 101 of the Patent
Act, 87 CAL. L. REV. 421, 423-24 (1999) (describing six requirements for patentability
as patentable subject matter, utility, novelty, a timely filed patent application,
nonobviousness, and a description of “the best method of making or using the
invention so as to enable one or ordinary skill in the art to practice the invention”).
Although an invention must meet all of these requirements, this Comment will only
address patentable subject matter, novelty, nonobviousness, and utility. For a
detailed discussion of the written description requirement, see Lisa A. Karczewski,
Biotechnological Gene Patent Applications: The Implications of USPTO Written Description
Requirement Guidelines on the Biotechnology Industry, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1043, 1060-64
(2000).
5
35 U.S.C. § 102 (2001).
6
Id. at § 103.
7
Id. at § 101.
8
See infra note 38.
9
G. Kenneth Smith & Denise M. Kettelberger, Patents and the Human Genome
Project, 22 AIPLA Q. J. 27, 50 (1994) (describing the increase in patent applications
after the NIH’s initial applications for cDNA fragments).
10
The PTO is the agency within the United States Department of Commerce
responsible for granting and issuing patents, as well as registering trademarks. 35
U.S.C. §§ 1(a), 2(a)(1) (2001).
11
Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092 (Jan. 5, 2001) [hereinafter
Utility Examination Guidelines I].
12
Id.
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granted for gene sequences that do not possess substantial utility.
The question remains, however, whether the PTO acted within its
authority in issuing the new Guidelines. The PTO is bound by
congressional intent and judicial interpretation of the meaning of
14
“utility.” While the modern judicial trend reflects a more relaxed
standard for utility, the PTO’s heightened utility standard may be the
subject of legal challenges as PTO Examiners continue to reject
claims for truly patentable inventions based on alleged lack of utility.
This Comment will examine the interplay between the PTO’s
revised Guidelines that pertain to patent applications for human
genes, and the legal basis behind the utility requirements for
patentability. Part I will explain the scientific background regarding
genes and their functions. Part II will give an overview of the
American patent system. Focusing on the utility requirement for
patents, this section also traces relevant case law dealing with the
legal construction of the concept of “utility.” Part III will discuss the
proliferation of patent applications for human gene sequences and
the PTO’s response. This section will also explore the practical effect
of the new Guidelines by reviewing actual claim rejections that the
15
PTO issued under section 101. Part IV will discuss the implications
of the PTO’s actions and the legal challenges the PTO may face by
raising the utility requirement “hurdle,” specifically for gene patents.
This Part suggests that the PTO replace the revised Guidelines with a
methodology that is defined by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Brenner
16
v. Manson,
which focused on the utility requirement for
patentability, the legislative history of the utility doctrine, and the
Court of Appeal for the Federal Circuit’s (“Federal Circuit”) most
recent articulation of the utility standard.

13

See M. Scott McBride, Comment, Patentability of Human Genes: Our Patent System
Can Address the Issues Without Modification, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 511, 532 (2001) (“[The]
new [utility] standard is likely to protect researchers performing bona fide research
on particular genes against those who patent ESTs to lay claim to those genes of
which they have no knowledge.”).
14
See generally Orin S. Kerr, Rethinking Patent Law in the Administrative State, 42 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 127, 138-41 (describing the role of the PTO).
15
35 U.S.C. § 101 provides that “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title.” 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2001).
16
383 U.S. 519 (1966).
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I. AN INTRODUCTION TO GENES
A. The Fundamentals of Molecular Biology
To understand the legal issues surrounding the patentability of
human genes, it is important to have a basic understanding of
molecular genetics. The human body, complete with physical traits
and characteristics, represents the final product of a series of
complex biochemical functions that occur at the cellular level. Genes
are the functional units of heredity. They are composed of
deoxyribonucleic acid (“DNA”), the molecule possessing functional
17
properties that earn its distinction as the cell’s master molecule.
DNA indirectly codes or dictates the structures of molecules that are
18
made by proteins, including sugars and fats. DNA not only governs
the structure, but also the timing and quantity of the molecule’s
19
synthesis.
The individual building blocks, or nucleotides, that comprise
DNA consist of a phosphate group, a deoxyribose sugar, and one of
the four nitrogen bases known as adenine, cytosine, guanine, and
20
thymine. These bases link together, in a particular order, to create
21
The DNA molecule typically has from 3000 to
a specific gene.
22
several million nucleotide units arranged in a double helix. The
helix consists of two chains of alternating phosphate and deoxyribose
23
units in continuous linkages. The nitrogen bases project inwardly
24
toward the axis of the helix. Adenine always unites with thymine,
25
and cytosine with guanine. The sequences of the bases on the chain
vary with the individual, and it is this sequence that expresses the
26
genetic code.
27
After a complex series of events called transcription and

17

HARVEY LODISH ET AL., MOLECULAR CELL BIOLOGY 9-10 (3d ed. 1995).
DNA “indirectly” codes for proteins because DNA is first transcribed into
another nucleic acid, RNA, which then is translated into protein. Id. at 10, 12.
19
Id. at 10.
20
Id. at 102-05.
21
Id. at 4.
22
Id. at 104-05.
23
LODISH ET AL., supra note 17, at 104-05.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id. at 102.
27
During transcription, one strand of DNA is used as a template to create a
complementary RNA, or more specifically, messenger RNA (“mRNA”). See generally
id. at 119, G-12.
18
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28

translation, the gene ultimately creates specific proteins that
execute the program of cellular activities for which the gene
29
encodes.
Proteins, or the “working molecules” of a cell, are
30
responsible for the basic biological functions of living organisms. In
addition to building and maintaining the structure of the cell and its
31
organelles, proteins catalyze many intracellular and extracellular
chemical reactions that are vitally intertwined in the physiology of
cells. Proteins make cells move, perform work, and direct synthesis of
32
other proteins and molecules.
They determine cell constitution
33
and function and move molecules across membranes. Given their
central role in the complicated orchestration of cellular events,
proteins are fundamental to the biology of life.
Because of the devastating effects that could result from a single
mistake during these cellular events, many scientists and researchers
devote countless hours toward understanding biochemical processes.
A single mutation or deviation in the gene sequence has the potential
of creating a new protein that can result in a life-threatening disease,
rather than the healthy function encoded by the original genetic
34
sequence.
For example, because of gene mutations, a person
diagnosed with phenylketonuria is incapable of digesting a dietary
35
constituent. Another example of a genetic mutation may result in a
dysfunctional molecule that normally helps to organize the inside of
36
a muscle cell. Instead of a healthy muscle, the disease of muscular
37
Thus, there is a
dystrophy would devastate the individual.
compelling need to understand the biochemical processes at the
cellular level, because they are the starting point of many disorders
and diseases that affect so many human lives.
A genome is the entire genetic makeup of an organism. A
bacterium’s genome consists of approximately six hundred thousand
DNA base pairs, in contrast to the human and mouse genome which

28

Translation refers to the phase of protein synthesis when the mRNA encodes
the amino acid sequence that determines the protein to be made. See generally id. at
120.
29
LODISH ET AL., supra note 17, at 51.
30
Id.
31
Organelles are the membrane-limited structures found within a cell’s
cytoplasm, including mitochondria, lysosomes, and golgi bodies. See id. at 8-9.
32
Id. at 9, 119-38.
33
Id. at 9.
34
Id.
35
LODISH ET AL., supra note 17, at 9.
36
Id.
37
Id.
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38

consists of about three billion DNA base pairs. Considering the vast
differences in complexity between the bacterium and human species,
the large discrepancy in the number of base pairs is not surprising.
Rather, the difference illustrates the governing role genes play in the
evolution of living organisms. Despite the large number of available
base pairs in the human genome, only two to five percent of the
39
genome encodes protein.
The non-coding regions of the DNA
40
serve other functions such as regulating gene expression.
B. The Human Genome Project
41

The Human Genome Project — initiated by the U.S.
Department of Energy and the National Institutes of Health (“NIH”)
— is a worldwide coordinated effort to sequence the entire human
genome and to catalog its estimated 100,000 genes found in the
42
human chromosomes.
Originally designed to be a thirteen-year
project, advances in biotechnology and laboratory techniques
43
substantially shortened the estimated time for completion. In the
year 2000, it was predicted that the entire human genome sequence
44
would be completed within four to six years. Thus far, researchers
have collected vast amounts of genetic information. A method for
gene identification, known as complementary DNA (“cDNA”)
45
sequencing, now quickly and easily identifies genes. In 1991, Dr.
38

Human Genome Project Information Website, The Science Behind the Human
Genome Project: Basic Genetics, Genome Draft Sequence, and Post-Genome Science, at
http://www.ornl.gov/hgmis/project/info.html (last modified May 6, 2002) (on file
with author).
39
Andrew T. Knight, Pregnant with Ambiguity: Credibility and the PTO Utility
Guidelines In Light of Brenner, 73 IND. L.J. 997, 1003 (1998).
40
Andrew G. Clark, The Search for Meaning in Noncoding DNA, available at
http://www.linkage.rockefeller.edu/wli/dna_corr/clark01.pdf (last visited Jul. 28,
2002) (on file with author).
41
See Human Genome Project Information Website, About the Human Genome
Project, at http://www.ornl.gov/hgmis/project/about.html (last modified July 26,
2001) (on file with author).
42
See John M. Golden, Biotechnology, Technology Policy, and Patentability: Natural
Products and Invention in the American System, 50 EMORY L.J. 101, 115 (2001); see also
Joseph P. Pieroni, The Patentability of Expressed Sequence Tags, 9 FED. CIR. B.J. 401, 403
(2000); John J. Doll, The Patenting of DNA, 280 SCIENCE 689-90 (1998).
43
See Golden, supra note 42, at 115 (noting that these advances have eased much
of the process of isolating, identifying, and sequencing genes by “substantially
routinizing a variety of tasks that had previously required considerable effort and
ingenuity”).
44
See Pieroni, supra note 42, at 403.
45
See Adams et al., Complementary DNA Sequencing: Expressed Sequence Tags and
Human Genome Project, 252 SCIENCE 1651 (1991) (describing technique for identifying
expressed sequence tags); see also Knight, supra note 39, at 1003.
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Craig Venter and his associates at the NIH developed this approach.
The process involves cDNA sequences which are “edited” copies of a
47
gene, rather than the full-length genomic DNA sequence.
The
shorter sequences, which only contain protein-coding regions, allow
48
The
for quicker identification and characterization of genes.
widespread use of cDNA sequencing identified approximately 50,000
49
human genes as of September 1995.
On June 25, 2000, President Clinton announced that researchers
50
sequenced the human genome in its entirety. The Human Genome
Project and Celera Genomics Corporation, a privately funded
company which set forth a “rough draft” of the human genome,
51
accomplished this historic achievement. Although sequencing the
entire human genome is a landmark achievement in and of itself, the
real challenges facing scientists — including understanding the gene
52
and protein functions — remain ahead.
Elucidating the DNA
sequence alone does not provide researchers with much information
53
on how to develop treatments or cure diseases. This can only be
accomplished by understanding the biological functions which
54
Thus, the focus for
correspond to the newly identified genes.
researchers in the years to come will shift away from the genetic
blueprint of the human genome itself, and move toward the protein
functions encoded by the genes.

46

See Pieroni, supra note 42, at 401.
See Knight, supra note 39, at 1003 (noting that these shorter sequences can be
characterized more rapidly than longer genomic sequences).
48
Id.
49
Id. at 1004.
50
See Human Genome Project Information Website, White House Press Release,
President Clinton Announces the Completion of the First Survey of the Entire Human Genome,
available at http://www.ornl.gov/hgmis/project/clinton1.html (last modified Feb.
28, 2001) (on file with author).
51
See Golden, supra note 42, at 115.
52
The process of cDNA sequencing received much criticism from eminent
members of the field. One critic in particular was James Watson who, along with
Francis Crick, determined the double-helical structure of DNA. When Watson
commented on the NIH’s patent applications for certain gene sequences, he noted
“that ‘virtually any monkey’ can run an automated sequencing machine,” and that
the real importance lies in the interpretation of the sequence. See Knight, supra note
39, at 1004.
53
Dr. Venter analogized this information to “getting a list of phone numbers for
a certain city with no names attached,” and argued that a cDNA sequence alone does
not tell a researcher what the sequence does “unless it’s a sequence from a gene
whose function is already known.” Id.
54
Id.
47
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C. Recombinant DNA Technology Allows for Genetic Analysis
Recombinant DNA technology allows researchers to unlock the
55
mystery behind DNA and protein functions. In the 1970s, technical
advances in laboratory techniques led to breakthroughs in molecular
56
biology. Recombinant DNA technology allows scientists to purify a
specific gene, determine its sequence and explore it functional
57
regions. This form of genetic engineering is accomplished through
58
the manipulation and cloning of DNA. A particular enzyme, called
a restrictive enzyme, cleaves the DNA at specific sequences and yields
59
a reproducible set of fragments. These DNA fragments insert into a
60
vector DNA molecule which has the ability to replicate when it is
61
inserted into a host cell. The DNA fragment of interest along with
62
the vector molecule form what is known as the recombinant DNA.
The recombinant DNA enters into host cells, which are most often
63
Under appropriate conditions, bacterial cells
bacterial cells.
replicate exponentially and yield large numbers of the recombinant
64
DNA molecules. Once the desired sequence is cloned and cleaved,
the fragment of interest can be isolated and analyzed, thus providing
65
large quantities of the gene at scientists’ disposal.
D. Expressed Sequence Tags
Given the central role that Expressed Sequence Tags (“EST”)
played in shaping the new Guidelines, it is helpful to have a basic
66
understanding of the meaning of ESTs. At any given time during
the life of a cell, only a subset of genes within an entire genome is
67
active. The genes that are being expressed have been transcribed
55

See LODISH ET AL., supra note 17, at 221.
Id.
57
Id. at 222.
58
See id. at 221-25.
59
Id. at 221.
60
Bacterial plasmids are commonly used as cloning vectors. Id. at 222. These are
small, circular extrachromosomal DNA molecules that replicate autonomously in a
bacterial cell. Id.
61
LODISH ET AL., supra note 17, at 222.
62
Id. at 221-22.
63
Id. at 221.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 240.
66
For additional background information on ESTs, see Machin, supra note 4, at
434-35.
67
Molly A. Holman & Stephen R. Munzer, Intellectual Property Rights in Genes and
Gene Fragments: A Registration Solution for Expressed Sequence Tags, 85 IOWA L. REV. 735,
748 (2000).
56
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from DNA and take the form of mRNA within the cell. Scientists
can survey the active genes of a cell by extracting mRNA, converting
69
70
it to cDNA, and sequencing it. ESTs are essentially a short length
of the cDNA that represent part of a gene that was being expressed at
71
that given time. Thus, ESTs are not individually selected, but result
72
from a random selection. Because ESTs are only a fraction of the
gene to which they correspond, ESTs do not provide much useful
73
information regarding the full extent of a gene’s functions. ESTs,
however, can be useful for isolating full-length genes, or for marking
74
coding regions of genomic DNA sequences. Beyond these primarily
intermediate functions, ESTs do not play a significant part in the
quest for understanding the true nature of gene and protein
75
functions.
II. THE AMERICAN PATENT SYSTEM
A. Foundation and Development of the Current Patent System
The United States Constitution embodies the source of federal
patent legislation. Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, grants Congress the
exclusive power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
76
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” In the
interest of developing a uniform system of law governing patents and
copyrights, this provision of the Constitution earned the approval of
77
the Framers without debate. The Framers clearly recognized the
necessity of such a system in light of the increased rate of
industrialization and the potential interstate conflicts that were to
inevitably occur as a result of the dissimilarities in state patent

68

Id. For the definition of mRNA, see supra note 27.
Holman & Munzer, supra note 67, at 748.
70
ESTs are generally 400-500 nucleotides in length, compared to full-length
genes which are generally 2,000 to 25,000 nucleotides in length. Id. at 749.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Holman & Munzer, supra note 67, at 750; see also Leora Ben-Ami et al., Biotech
Patent Law Developments, 573 PLI/PAT 555, 558 (1999).
74
Holman & Munzer, supra note 67, at 749.
75
Id. at 749-50; see also Ben-Ami et al., supra note 73, at 558.
76
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
77
CHISUM ET AL., supra note 1, at 16-17; see also Charles C. Wong, State Immunity
Doctrine: Demoting the Patent System, 53 ME. L. REV. 111, 117-20 (2001) (discussing the
evolution of the federal patent law system beginning with the constitutional grant for
the enactment of patent legislation).
69
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78

customs. Thus, following the proposal of this provision, the power
to enact patent legislation became one of the enumerated powers of
79
Congress on September 5, 1787.
Congress passed the first patent statute, the Patent Act of 1790,
80
on April 10, 1790. The Act authorized the granting of patents for
“any useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any
81
The Act also
improvement therein not before known or used.”
created a patent board, rather than a patent office, that was
82
responsible for examining patent applications. In response to the
workload that proved to be burdensome for a three-member panel, a
registration system was implemented with the promulgation of the
83
1793 Patent Act. The registration system lasted for forty-three years,
until Congress enacted the 1836 Patent Act, which is known as “the
84
foundation of the modern patent system in the United States.” One
of the major changes under the revised Patent Act included the
reimplementation of the examination requirement, namely that the
85
application be examined for utility and novelty.
In 1850, the
Supreme Court established an additional patentability requirement
86
in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, the “flash of genius” standard, which much
87
later evolved into the nonobviousness requirement.
The patent
88
This revision imposed the
code was again revised in 1870.
requirement that the patent applicant define his invention with more
89
clarity by focusing on the patent’s claims.
90
Patent law underwent a major statutory revision in 1952.
Congress drafted the 1952 Act in response to an “anti-patent fervor”
78

See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 1, at 16; see also Wong, supra note 77, at 118
(describing the Patent Clause as “both a grant of power and a limitation” with the
specific objective of encouraging innovation, while avoiding monopolies that would
stifle competition).
79
CHISUM ET AL., supra note 1, at 16.
80
Id. at 18.
81
Id. (quotations in original).
82
Id.
83
Id. at 19.
84
Id.
85
CHISUM ET AL., supra note 1, at 20. Additionally, the 1836 Patent Act
designated the Patent Office as a separate bureau of the Department of State,
created the office of the Commissioner of Patents, created the patent numbering
system, and also allowed for an applicant to appeal to a three member board if his
application was rejected. Id. at 20-21.
86
52 U.S. 248 (1850).
87
CHISUM ET AL., supra note 1, at 20.
88
Id. at 21.
89
Id.
90
Id.
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that was developing in the Supreme Court. The 1952 Patent Act,
which serves as the current patent legislation codified under Title 35
92
of the United States Code, strengthened the patent system with
93
respect to patentability and infringement issues. In 1982, Congress
established the Federal Circuit and vested in it exclusive jurisdiction
94
over patent appeals.
Prior to 1982, the regional circuits heard
95
patent appeals and issued disparate standards for patentability. The
Federal Circuit now provides a single forum to uniformly interpret
the patent law on appeal, giving new force and validity to the patent
96
law system in the United States.
B. Patentable Subject Matter and § 112 Requirements
A patent confers upon the patent holder “the right to exclude
others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention
91

Id. at 21-22. Between 1890 and 1930, the Court looked favorably at the patent
system. This changed from 1930 to 1950, when the Court began to view the granting
of patents with suspicion, largely because of the monopolistic nature of patents. Id.
at 21. This negative outlook manifested in several Supreme Court decisions. For
example, the Court’s decision in Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320
U.S. 661 (1944), expanded the doctrine of patent misuse. In Halliburton Oil Well
Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1 (1946), the Court invalidated the practice of
“means plus function” claim drafting. Additionally, the Court required synergism for
the patentability of combination patents in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v.
Supermarket Equipment Co., 340 U.S. 147 (1950). CHISUM ET AL., supra note 1, at 21-22.
92
35 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (2001).
93
Some provisions of the 1952 Act were enacted in response to the Supreme
Court decisions that restricted certain patent law principles. See supra note 91. For
example, the invalidation of “means plus function” which resulted from the
Halliburton decision was overturned with the enactment of § 112. CHISUM ET AL.,
supra note 1, at 21-22. Sections 271(b), (c), and (d) reversed the Supreme Court’s
broad reading of patent misuse and contributory infringement in Mercoid. Id.
Additionally, § 103 implemented an objective standard of nonobviousness which
removed the synergism requirement set forth in the Great Atlantic decision. Id.
94
The Federal Courts Improvement Act [hereinafter “the Act”] established the
Federal Circuit. Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982) (Apr. 2, 1982). See generally
Dennis DeConcini, Symposium Issue: Celebrating the Tenth Anniversary of the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 529 (1992). In an effort to ease
the enormous caseload burdening the appellate courts of the federal judicial system,
the Act consolidated the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals under the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit. Id. The Act also sought to
achieve national uniformity in the law, particularly in the area of patents. Id. at 532.
During the time preceding the promulgation of the Act, patent law was in a state of
complete disarray. Id. Thus, in order to regain consistency in the law and a more
effective judicial system, the Federal Circuit became the appellate court with
exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals from federal district court decisions. Id. at
534.
95
CHISUM ET AL., supra note 1, at 22.
96
Providing a single forum in which patent appeals could be heard improved the
problems associated with forum shopping. Id.
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throughout the United States or importing the invention into the
United States” for a period of 20 years from the filing date of the
97
application.
In order to receive a patent for an invention, the
invention must fall within the statutory scope of patentable subject
matter set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 101, which provides that “[w]hoever
invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the
98
conditions and requirements of this title.” Generally, the claimed
invention must satisfy the following requirements for patentability:
99
100
101
novelty, nonobviousness, and utility.
Several threshold issues must be addressed before determining
whether the invention is patentably distinct from prior art. Initially,
one must determine if the invention itself is the kind of invention
102
that Congress contemplated as patentable.
The invention must be
a “process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter,” that is,
one of the four categories of statutory subject matter articulated in
103
section 101.
104
In the landmark case Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the Supreme
Court interpreted these statutory classes broadly to “include anything
105
under the sun that is made by man.”
Chakrabarty sought a patent
for a genetically engineered bacterium that was capable of degrading
106
several components of crude oil.
The Court noted that naturally
occurring subject matter generally does not qualify as patentable
107
subject matter.
The Court, however, held that Chakrabarty’s
genetically engineered bacterium was patentable subject matter,
because as a result of the inventor’s own work it possessed markedly

97

35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1)-(2) (2001).
Id. at § 101.
99
See id. at § 102.
100
See id. at § 103.
101
See id. at § 101.
102
CHISUM ET AL., supra note 1, at 728.
103
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2001); see Karczewski, supra note 4, at 1054 (discussing the
categories and limits of statutory subject matter and the inclusion of biotechnological
inventions under the ruling in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980)).
104
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303.
105
Id. at 309 (citing Committee Reports, S. REP. NO. 82-1979 (1952); H.R. REP.
NO. 82-1923 (1952)); see also Ben-Ami et al., supra note 73, at 557 (“[T]he Supreme
Court’s 1980 decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty opened the door for the patenting of
virtually every kind of living matter . . . . “).
106
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 305.
107
Id. at 309.
98

2002

139

COMMENT
108

different properties from the original bacterium.
Following this
line of reasoning, biotechnological inventions may fall within the
broad scope of patentable subject matter, because scientists go
through the steps of isolating the gene from other molecules with
109
which it is associated in its naturally occurring state.
Next, section 112 requires that the claims adequately teach one
110
of ordinary skill in the art how to make and use the invention and
111
to illustrate the best mode of the invention. The claims must be
112
definite in scope and distinct from all other issued or allowable
113
claims.
C. The Requirements of Novelty and Nonobviousness
Once a patent application satisfies the requirements of 35 U.S.C.
§§ 101 and 112, the claims must also satisfy the novelty requirements
114
as set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 102.
In general, the PTO will not grant
patents for inventions that are not new or, in patent law language,
115
have been “anticipated by the prior art.” To avoid anticipation, the
invention must not have been known or used by others before the
116
Also, the inventor will be statutorily barred
date of the invention.
from receiving a patent if an event occurs that triggers section
117
102(b).
For example, the invention must not have been publicly
118
used or offered for sale more than a year before the date of filing.
Although many refer to section 102 “as a statutory mine field through
which patent applicants must navigate in order to obtain a patent,” it
is in place to ensure that patents are awarded to inventors for only
novel inventions, provided that inventors file their patent

108

Id. at 309-10.
Id. at 310.
110
See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2001).
111
See id.
112
See id.
113
See supra note 4.
114
The novelty requirement is embodied in subsections (a), (e), and (g) of § 102,
and is triggered by the works of others. Subsections (b) and (d) of § 102 involve the
inventor’s loss of right, which can result from the inventor’s own actions, such as
failing to file an application within the statutory timeframe. See generally CHISUM ET
AL., supra note 1, at 327; see also Mattias Luukonen, Note, Gene Patents: How Useful Are
the New Utility Requirements?, 23 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 337, 348 (2001) (discussing the
novelty requirement for patentability).
115
35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2001); see CHISUM ET AL., supra note 1, at 323.
116
Id. at § 102(a).
117
Id. at § 102(b).
118
Id.
109
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applications with diligence.
The second hurdle, nonobviousness, prevents a person from
obtaining patent protection for an invention that could already be
120
considered to be in the public domain.
To satisfy section 103, the
invention must be different, although not necessarily better, from the
121
prior art.
In Hotchkiss, the inventor sought a patent for substituting
122
the metallic knob of a doorknob with a clay or porcelain knob.
The Supreme Court denied the patent because of the absence of
123
ingenuity on the part of the inventor. The Court reasoned that the
inventor must display some ingenuity or skill beyond that of an
124
“ordinary mechanic.”
This holding essentially created the
125
patentability requirement of nonobviousness.
D. The Utility Requirement
This Comment focuses on the utility requirement for
patentability, as it applies to patent applications for gene sequences.
An invention must be useful to be patentable. The requirement of
utility is rooted in the constitutional goal of “promot[ing] the
126
Progress of . . . useful Arts,” and is currently codified in section 101
127
of the Patent Act.
Judicial interpretation of cases brought before
the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit, and its predecessor, the
128
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (“CCPA”), largely defines the
true meaning of this seemingly simple concept. From the earliest
129
interpretation of utility in Lowell v. Davis
to the modern
130
interpretation articulated in Brenner v. Manson,
the utility
119

CHISUM ET AL., supra note 1, at 323. Under § 102(b), the current time frame in
which an inventor must file his application without losing his rights is twelve months
after a triggering event. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2001).
120
CHISUM ET AL., supra note 1, at 514.
121
Id. at 515.
122
Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248, 264 (1850).
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
CHISUM ET AL., supra note 1, at 515.
126
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
127
35 U.S.C. § 101 provides that, “Whoever invents or discovers any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions
and requirements of this title.” 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2001).
128
Donald L. Zuhn, Jr., DNA Patentability: Shutting the Door to the Utility Requirement,
34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 973, 984 (2001); see also Machin, supra note 4, at 437 (listing
the three sources of the current utility doctrine as the language in the Constitution,
the Patent Act, and court decisions).
129
15 F. Cas. 1018 (D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8568).
130
383 U.S. 519 (1966).
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requirement is undoubtedly a dynamic standard that continues to be
redefined as the technological environment of the modern age
changes.
Justice Story articulated one of the first interpretations of utility
131
in Lowell. In 1817, Justice Story applied a de minimis standard to the
132
He stated that a useful “invention should not
utility requirement.
be frivolous or injurious to the well-being, good policy, or sound
133
morals of society.”
This interpretation deemed an invention to be
134
Based on
useful if it was neither harmful nor immoral to society.
this morality standard, Justice Story also recognized that individuals
would be able to obtain patents for inventions that were not “useful”
135
in a practical sense.
Justice Story found this acceptable based on
the reasoning that the “useless” invention “will silently sink into
contempt and disregard,” bearing little importance or cost to the
136
public.
Courts followed this low standard for patentability without much
137
138
disruption for nearly 150 years.
In Brenner v. Manson, however,
the Supreme Court transformed the utility requirement into a more
139
meaningful standard for patentability.
The Court held that a
chemical process which produced a certain class of compounds was
140
Specifically, the process yielded
not useful under section 101.
certain steroid compositions which did not possess any tumor141
inhibiting qualities.
Chemically-related compounds, or
homologues, however, produced these tumor-inhibiting effects in

131

Lowell, 15 F. Cas. 1019.
Id.
133
Id. at 1019; see also Machin, supra note 4, at 435-36 (discussing the doctrine of
moral utility as a doctrine intended to protect society from harm).
134
Lowell, 15 F. Cas. at 1019.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Zuhn, supra note 128, at 986.
138
383 U.S. 519 (1966).
139
See Machin, supra note 4, at 428-30 (discussing the practical utility requirement
that was created by the Supreme Court in Brenner).
140
Brenner, 383 U.S. at 532.
141
Id. at 522. In this case, the Court specifically noted that their ruling was based
on the fact the compound showed no utility, other than its potential role as a tumorinhibiting compound in mice. Thus, the Court suggests that a different outcome
may have resulted if the compound was useful as a tumor-inhibitor or useful in some
other way. Id. at 532 n.17 (“In light of our disposition of the case, we express no view
as to the patentability of a process whose sole demonstrated utility is to yield a
product shown to inhibit the growth of tumors in laboratory animals.”). This
highlights the emphasis the Court placed on the showing of some degree of utility as
opposed to no utility at all. Id.
132
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mice.
The applicant attempted to obtain a patent for this process
although he “did not disclose a sufficient likelihood that the steroid
yielded by his process would have similar tumor-inhibiting
143
characteristics.”
The Patent Office Examiner rejected the patent application for
failing to disclose the utility associated with the chemical compounds
144
produced by the process.
The CCPA rejected the Examiner’s
position on utility by concluding that “where a claimed process
produces a known product[,] it is not necessary to show utility for the
product, so long as the product is not alleged to be detrimental to the
145
public interest.”
The Supreme Court enunciated a practical standard for
determining whether the disclosure of utility was sufficient. Although
the Court decided Brenner over thirty years ago, years before the
technological advances involving recombinant DNA technology, the
Supreme Court’s opinion echoed concerns that are fully applicable
to the current issues surrounding gene patents. Turning its focus
away from a moral standard for utility, the Court reasoned that the
nature of chemical inventions demanded a more thoughtful inquiry
146
into utility.
The quid pro quo rationale behind patent legislation is
to grant an inventor a patent monopoly in exchange for the benefit
147
of his useful invention to society.
Without knowing the full extent of an invention’s utility, the
Court opined that the public is threatened with danger by the grant
of a monopoly that “may engross a vast, unknown, and perhaps
148
unknowable area.” Such a patent has the potential of stifling whole
areas of scientific development, without providing any real benefit to
149
society.
According to the Court, this is not the type of result
contemplated by the Framers or by Congress when enacting patent
150
legislation. Rather, a patentable invention must possess “substantial
151
utility” from which society may obtain a specific benefit.
142

Id.
Id. at 532.
144
Id. at 521.
145
Id. at 522 (internal quotations omitted).
146
Brenner, 383 U.S. at 533-36.
147
Id. at 534.
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
Id.
151
Id. at 534-35; see also Ben-Ami et al., supra note 73, at 559 (“The Brenner
standard is often referred to as ‘substantial utility’ or ‘practical utility’”) (internal
quotations in original).
143
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Recognizing the importance of scientific contributions falling short
of a useful invention, the Court nonetheless clarified that “a patent is
not a hunting license . . . [nor] a reward for the search, but
152
compensation for its successful conclusion.”
153
In the following year, two CCPA decisions, In re Kirk and In re
154
Joly,
followed and expanded the “substantial” utility standard
articulated in Brenner. Both cases involved patent applications for
steroidal compounds which the applicants alleged were useful as
intermediates for preparing other compounds with biological
155
properties.
The CCPA concluded that, for purposes of the utility
requirement, it is insufficient to assert that a chemical intermediate
exists and is capable of producing “some intended product of no
156
known use.”
Nor is it sufficient, the court added, to assert that the
product of the chemical intermediate belongs to a class of
compounds that may one day be the subject of research to determine
157
specific use. In the realm of patent legislation, the court noted that
it is not the responsibility of the public, the PTO, or the courts “to
play . . . [a] guessing game” in determining the utility of an
158
invention.
Judge Rich and Judge Smith, the only CCPA judges who had
patent law experience, offered important dissenting opinions in Kirk
159
and Joly.
Judge Rich, one of the principal drafters of the 1952
160
Judge Rich reviewed
Patent Act, made several cogent observations.
both the legislative history and court decisions pertaining to the
161
meaning of “useful.”
According to Judge Rich, the term “utility”
was a prerequisite to patentability from the first patent legislation in
162
Throughout that
1790 to the current legislation enacted in 1952.
162-year span, there was an absence of legislative history suggesting
163
that the utility requirement should be changed.
Judge Rich also noted that the Brenner Court could not find

152

Brenner, 383 U.S. at 536.
376 F.2d 936 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
154
376 F.2d 906 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
155
Kirk, 376 F.2d at 939; Joly, 376 F.2d at 907.
156
Kirk, 376 F.2d at 945.
157
Id.
158
Id. at 942.
159
CHISUM ET AL., supra note 1, at 714.
160
Judge Giles Sutherland Rich is extensively regarded as “the founding father of
modern patent law.” Id. at 22-23.
161
Kirk, 376 F.2d at 954-55.
162
Id. at 954 (Rich, J., dissenting).
163
Id.
153
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assistance in the legislative materials of section 101 which was enacted
under the 1952 Act. Judge Rich opined that this was so because “the
legislature was then taking no action with respect to that provision
except to reenact it without change, wherefore the true ‘legislative
materials’ necessarily consist only of its long history of construction
164
and repeated reenactment without change.” Furthermore, case law
165
indicated that “any degree of utility to anybody was legal ‘utility.’”
Thus, Congress enacted the present statute, 35 U.S.C. § 101, without
166
any intention to change the law.
Judge Rich suggested that the
majority in Kirk was engaging in judicial law-making, as there was no
basis in either the legislative history or case law for further raising the
167
standards of utility.
Judge Rich also criticized the majority’s reliance on the quid pro
168
quo philosophy.
The majority erroneously factored the degree of
169
an invention’s utility as part of the quid pro quo of patent system. To
the contrary, Judge Rich pointed out that the degree of utility is not
170
of public concern.
“The only quid pro quo demanded by statute is
full disclosure of a new and unobvious invention which is of some use
171
Judge Rich noted that a patentee has never been
to someone.”
required to explain the full extent of utility of his invention, most
often because this is rarely known until years after the invention has
172
been made.
Lastly, Judge Rich expressed concern regarding the definition of
“practical,” “substantial,” or “specific” utility and the foreseeable
administrative problems that may ensue from these “impossible-to173
define” criteria.
According to Judge Rich, if the problem of
chemical utility could not be resolved by the courts, Congress should
174
address the issue.
Judge Rich offered his own interpretation of the
best rule from an administrative standpoint, that all “chemical
compounds are per se ‘useful’ within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. 101 . .

164

Id.
Id. (internal quotations in original).
166
Id. (arguing that cases, texts, and administrative practice clearly demonstrate
that Congress did not intend to impose any changes on the utility requirement with
the promulgation of the Patent Act of 1952).
167
Kirk, 376 F.2d at 954.
168
See generally id. at 955.
169
Id. at 955.
170
Id.
171
Id.
172
Id.
173
Kirk, 376 F.2d at 957.
174
Id.
165
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175

. .”
Judge Rich reasoned that such a rule would encourage
researchers to develop, disclose, and market new compounds which
176
could then be put to experimental use.
New uses would be
developed, thereby conferring a benefit to the public by advancing
177
Judge Smith joined Judge Rich and issued his own
the art.
dissenting opinion in Joly, in which he purported to demonstrate how
the majority’s opinion “amount[ed] to no less than a usurpation of
the authority exclusively granted to Congress by Art. I, Sec. 8, Clause
178
8, of the Constitution.”
While Kirk and Joly clearly embraced the more stringent
interpretation of the utility standard set forth in Brenner, the ruling of
the CCPA in In re Krimmel initiated the modern trend of liberalizing
179
the utility test for pharmaceuticals.
In that case, the PTO denied a
180
patent application for eye medicine.
Although the applicant
demonstrated that the medicine worked on rabbits, the PTO and
Board of Appeals found that use insufficient to satisfy the utility
181
requirement.
The CCPA reversed, holding that that the
medication was useful for a purpose set forth in the patent
182
The court stated that “one who has taught the public
application.
that a compound exhibits some desirable pharmaceutical property in
a standard experimental animal has made a significant and useful
contribution to the art, even though it may eventually appear that the
183
compound is without value in the treatment of humans.”
In 1985, the Federal Circuit examined the “practical utility”
184
standard in Cross v. Iizuka.
This case involved an appeal of an
185
between parties claiming priority for
interference proceeding
186
certain imidazole derivative compounds. The compounds allegedly
inhibited the synthesis of thromboxane synthetase, an enzyme

175

Id. at 957.
Id. at 957-58.
177
Id.; see also CHISUM ET AL., supra note 1, at 713-14.
178
Joly, 376 F.2d at 910.
179
292 F.2d 948 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
180
Id. at 949.
181
Id. at 949-50.
182
Id. at 953-54.
183
Id. at 953.
184
753 F.2d 1040 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
185
An interference is a procedure that can be declared between two or more
parties before the Board of Patent Appeals when the parties claim the same
patentable invention. 37 C.F.R. § 1.601(i) (2002). During the proceeding, issues of
patentability and priority of invention are determined. Id.
186
Cross, 753 F.2d at 1041.
176
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implicated in the formation of platelet aggregation.
On the issue
188
of utility, the Federal Circuit held that in vitro
testing,
supplemented with in vivo pharmacological activity involving
structurally similar compounds, was sufficient to establish practical
189
utility under § 101.
The court relied in part on the accepted
practice of in vitro testing in the pharmaceutical industry as being a
190
reasonable predictor of utility in mammals.
191
The Federal Circuit’s more recent decision in In re Brana
exemplifies the modern trend of a more relaxed utility standard.
Applicants appealed the denial of a patent application for anti-tumor
192
compounds.
The PTO based the denial on the fact that the
application did not identify a specific human disease or condition
193
The claimed agents were,
which was treatable by the compounds.
however, screened for anti-tumor activity with in vivo testing in
194
mice.
The PTO concluded that in vivo testing in animals was
195
insufficient to establish utility for treating cancer in humans.
In
essence, the PTO argued that efficacy in animals is not a reasonable
predictor for utility in treating corresponding human diseases or
196
conditions.
Relying on Krimmel, the Federal Circuit disagreed and
concluded that the applicant had, in fact, satisfied the utility standard
197
through the use of in vivo tests in experimental animals.
“Title 35
does not demand that such human testing occur within the confines
198
of . . . [the PTO] proceedings.”
The court noted that approval by
the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), in the context of
pharmaceutical inventions, is not a prerequisite to the utility
199
requirement under section 101. Moreover, it is expected that these
types of inventions will require further testing and experimentation

187

Id. at 1042.
Id. at 1043 n.6 (noting that in vitro generally refers to a testing environment
outside of the living organism, whereas in vivo refers to the environment inside a
living organism).
189
Id. at 1051.
190
Id. at 1050 (noting that in vitro is generally less expensive, less complex and
more time-efficient than in vivo testing methods).
191
51 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
192
Id. at 1562.
193
Id. at 1563.
194
Id. at 1562.
195
Id. at 1567.
196
Id.
197
Brana, 51 F.3d at 1567-68; see also supra text accompanying notes 179-83.
198
Id. at 1567.
199
Id. at 1568.
188
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before reaching a stage that is useful to humans.
Requiring
scientists to prove the advanced stages of utility would stifle
significant areas of research due to high costs and low incentives to
201
discover new inventions.
The Federal Circuit articulated its retreat from the CCPA’s
stringent interpretation of utility, and moved toward the direction of
Judge Rich’s view in Kirk, by setting forth a two-step analysis for
202
determining the utility of an invention.
First, the PTO has the
burden of challenging “a presumptively correct assertion of utility in
203
the disclosure.” Second, “after the PTO provides evidence showing
that one of ordinary skill in the art would reasonably doubt the
asserted utility . . . the burden shift[s] to the applicant to provide
rebuttal evidence sufficient to convince such a person of the
204
invention’s asserted utility.”
Thus, with the initial burden on the
PTO to cast doubt based on scientific evidence of an invention’s
utility, the dynamic utility requirement became less of an
205
insurmountable hurdle as it once was before the days of Brenner.
In keeping with this more relaxed view of the utility
requirement, the Federal Circuit recently upheld the validity of a
206
patent in Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., for an invention that
207
did not possess a substantial utility.
Although this case did not
involve a biotechnological invention, the Juicy Whip opinion
elucidates the Federal Circuit’s most recent interpretation of the
utility standard. The invention claimed was “a post-mix beverage
208
dispenser that [was] designed to look like a pre-mix dispenser.”
The District Court for the Central District of California concluded
that the invention lacked utility because it deceived customers and
209
increased sales by imitation.
210
In
The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling.
articulating the standard for utility, the court stated that “[t]he
threshold of utility is not high: [a]n invention is ‘useful’ under

200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1566.
Brana, 51 F.3d at 1566.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 131-36.
185 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1368.
Id. at 1365.
Id.
Id.
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section 101 if it is capable of providing some identifiable benefit.”
Under this standard, “[t]he fact that one product can be altered to
make it look like another is in itself a specific benefit sufficient to
212
satisfy the statutory requirement of utility.” Furthermore, when the
court addressed public policy concerns regarding deceptive trade
practices, the court noted that the utility requirement is not a means
through which the PTO must take on the role of arbiters of deceptive
213
trade practices.
Rather, it is the responsibility of “[o]ther agencies,
such as the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the [FDA],” to
214
protect customers from fraud, deception, or other harms.
The
court concluded with the clear assertion that, until it is declared by
Congress that inventions are unpatentable for reasons such as
deceptiveness, there is no basis under section 101 to deny these
215
inventions patent protection.
Accordingly, the prevailing view
deems that any disclosed identifiable benefit satisfies the utility
requirement and that the PTO has the burden of refuting the
presumptive presence of such utility.
III. THE PATENT “GOLD RUSH” AND THE RAISED UTILITY STANDARDS
A. The Rise of Patent Applications for Gene Sequences in the PTO
After developing a sequencing method that allowed for rapid
216
identification of active gene sequences in the human genome, the
NIH quickly sought patent protection for more than three hundred
217
of these partial DNA sequences.
This move by the NIH initiated
the ongoing debate over whether partial DNA sequences are
patentable when the sequence alone reveals no information about
218
the corresponding full-length gene and its protein function.
211

Id. at 1366 (internal quotations in original).
185 F.3d at 1367.
213
Id. at 1368.
214
Id.
215
Id.
216
See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
217
The NIH applications included broad claims that had the effect of covering
genes and protein beyond the length of the specified sequence. See Zuhn, supra note
128, at 977-78 (stating that although the NIH was unaware of the full length gene to
which the EST corresponded, it sought patent protection over the partial gene
sequence, the full length sequence of the corresponding gene and the protein
products, which the full length sequence encoded); see also Pieroni, supra note 42, at
411 (“[A] very broad claim might cover the actual protein coded for by that gene . . .
based on very little of the gene itself. In fact, this is what the NIH had attempted to
claim in its earliest applications . . . .”).
218
See Bernadine Healy, On Gene Patenting, 327 N. ENGL. J. MED. 664, 665 (1992).
212
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Although the NIH apparently did not understand the full biological
utility of the claimed sequence, it did specify various utilities
associated with the ESTs. In particular, the NIH asserted that the
sequences could serve as probes to differentiate between brain tissue
219
and other types of tissue.
Alternatively, the NIH asserted that the
sequence could be used to construct oligonucleotides necessary for
220
various laboratory techniques.
After two rounds of rejection on its initial filing by the PTO, the
NIH ultimately abandoned its initial efforts toward procuring patent
221
protection for EST sequences.
Their withdrawal, however, did not
222
discourage public and private companies from following their lead.
Rather, genomics companies and institutions rapidly filed patent
223
Some of the most
applications for full or partial gene sequences.
224
active players in the race were Human Genome Sciences, InCyte
225
226
227
Genomics, Celera Genomics, and the University of California.
The PTO issued the first patent for an EST to InCyte
228
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. on October 6, 1998.
Contrary to the intense
opposition the NIH faced when it filed its first applications for
229
230
ESTs, the PTO issued U.S. Patent No. 5,817,479 (the ‘479 Patent)
219

See Zuhn, supra note 128, at 978 (citation omitted).
Id. at 978-79 (noting that “EST sequences could be used to design
oligonucleotides for use in chromosomal analysis, the polymerase chain reaction,
recovery of the corresponding full-length gene, as diagnostic markers for disease, or
in the design of antisense therapeutics”) (citations omitted).
221
Id. at 982. The NIH announced that seeking patent protection for gene
sequences without known function was “not in the best interests of the public or
science.” Id. at n.65 (quotations in original). During the filing of these applications,
the NIH was a target of much criticism of the biotech industry. See generally id. at 97983; see also Ben-Ami et al., supra note 73, at 558 (“[T]he NIH provoked a blizzard of
criticism from scientists when it filed patent applications covering thousands of
ESTs.”).
222
Zuhn, supra note 128, at 983.
223
See Antonio Regalado, The Great Gene Grab, TECH. REV., available at
http://www.technologyreview.com/magazine/sep00/regalado.asp (Sept./Oct. 2000)
(on file with author).
224
Human Genome Sciences, Inc. in Rockville, Maryland, is the commercial
counterpart to The Institute of Genomic Research in Gaithersburg, Maryland, which
is a non-profit research institution that was created by Dr. Venter after he left the
NIH in 1992. Zuhn, supra note 128, at n.69.
225
InCyte Genomics of Palo Alto, California, holds close to 400 patents for gene
sequences. Regalado, supra note 223.
226
See supra text accompanying note 51.
227
See Regalado, supra note 223.
228
Ben-Ami et al., supra note 73, at 560 n.17.
229
The NIH received much criticism from a number of members of the scientific
community for seeking patent protection for partial gene sequences without
knowing the full biological activity of the corresponding full-length gene. See
220
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with relatively little resistance.
In particular, the asserted utilities
specified in the ‘479 Patent apparently satisfied the PTO’s
requirement for utility, since no rejections based on lack of utility
232
were made.
The ‘479 Patent, entitled “Human Kinase Homologs,”
differed from the NIH filing in that it did not contain very broad
233
claims.
Rather, the patent claimed forty-four EST sequences that
234
Additionally, the
could be used to identify novel protein kinases.
PTO Examiner concluded that the ESTs “can be used to generate
235
kinase homologs.”
Although the ‘479 Patent appeared to have
passed the utility requirement hurdle with relative ease, this was not
236
The
the case for the many EST patent applications that followed.
issuance of the ‘479 Patent was, however, a clear indication from the
PTO that under certain circumstances, EST sequences are deemed
237
worthy of patent protection.
B. The Utility Examination Guidelines
In response to the increasing number of patent applications for
biotechnological inventions, the PTO established Utility Examination
238
Guidelines in 1995 (“1995 Guidelines”).
The 1995 Guidelines
239
established a two-pronged inquiry for utility.
According to the
inquiry, the invention had to assert a utility that was “specific” and

generally Zuhn, supra note 128, at 978-82 (noting that critics of the NIH filing
included James Watson; Nobel Laureate Paul Berg; C. Thomas Caskey, who is
President of the Human Genome Organization; and the Industrial Biotechnology
Association); see also Pieroni, supra note 42, at 411 (stating that the NIH also received
pressure from patent and research agencies outside of the United States, including
Britain’s science minister, Alan Howarth).
230
U.S. Patent No. 5,817,479 (issued Oct. 6, 1998).
231
See Ben-Ami et al., supra note 73, at 560-61.
232
The ‘479 Patent states that the claimed sequences can be used as
“hybridization probes, for chromosome and gene mapping, in PCR technologies, in
the production of sense or antisense nucleic acids, in screening for new therapeutic
molecules, etc.” U.S. Patent No. 5,817,479 (issued Oct. 6, 1998).
233
See Pieroni, supra note 42, at 412.
234
U.S. Patent No. 5,817,479 (issued Oct. 6, 1998). For further discussion on the
InCyte patent, see Holman & Munzer, supra note 67, at 770-71.
235
Ben-Ami et al., supra note 73, at 561 (quotations in original).
236
See Holman & Munzer, supra note 67, at 771 (explaining how the InCyte patent
is distinguishable from other EST patents because the sequences are “all from a
known protein family (kinases) with a known function (signaling)”).
237
Ben-Ami et al., supra note 73, at 560.
238
Utility Examination Guidelines, 60 Fed. Reg. 36323 (July 14, 1995)
[hereinafter Utility Examination Guidelines II].
239
J. Timothy Meigs, Biotechnology Patent Prosecution in View of PTO’s Utility
Examination Guidelines, 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 451, 458-59 (2001).
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“credible” to satisfy the utility requirement.
To assess “specific”
utility, patent Examiners need to determine whether a particular
241
purpose for the invention was clearly articulated.
Credibility, on
the other hand, was demonstrated if one of ordinary skill in the art
would have been convinced of the asserted utility based on all of the
242
facts and reasoning provided in each case.
The Commissioner of the PTO, Bruce Lehman, explained that
the 1995 Guidelines reflected the PTO’s position that proper
deference should be accorded to the experts in the field of
243
biotechnology.
In reviewing patent applications, the role of patent
Examiners was very clear—to evaluate the credibility of an asserted
244
utility.
This approach was a far cry from the “substantial” utility
approach articulated in Brenner. It appeared that the PTO adopted a
highly deferential, rubber stamp approach for the determination of
245
an invention’s utility.
The public quickly criticized the 1995
Guidelines because the guidelines did not require a showing of
246
“substantial” utility.
Thus, the 1995 Guidelines had the practical
effect of lowering the utility requirement or “propping open the
247
‘door’ to section 101,” which was indicative of the PTO’s implicit
248
acceptance over the patenting of EST sequences.
The PTO modified their position once again on January 5, 2001
249
when it published the current, revised version of the Guidelines.
240

Id. at 459. More specifically, the Guidelines instructed patent Examiners not
to reject an application for lack of utility “[i]f the applicant has asserted that the
claimed invention is useful for any particular purpose . . . and that assertion would be
considered credible by a person of ordinary skill in the art . . . .” Utility Examination
Guidelines II, supra note 238.
241
See Meigs, supra note 239, at 460.
242
Id.
243
See Knight, supra note 39, at 1015.
244
Id.
245
Id.
246
Ben-Ami et al., supra note 73, at 559 (“Critics of the PTO guidelines [were]
quick to point out that the standard of utility embodied in the guidelines [fell] short
of that imposed by the Supreme Court in Brenner.”).
247
See Zuhn, supra note 128, at 992; see also Knight, supra note 39, at 1015
(explaining that the 1995 Guidelines made rejections based on utility highly
unlikely).
248
See Zuhn, supra note 128, at 983 (“[The] new Utility Examination Guidelines . .
. seemingly removed some obstacles from the patenting of EST sequences.”).
249
Utility Examination Guidelines I, supra note 11. The publication noted that the
Guidelines were to be used for internal practices to assist PTO personnel in
determining whether an invention complies with the utility requirement under §
101. Id. “The Guidelines do not constitute substantive rulemaking and hence do not
have the force and effect of law. Rejections will be based upon the substantive law,
and it is these rejections which are appealable.” Id. at 1098.
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Prior to publication, the PTO issued Interim Guidelines and
250
requested comments from the public.
The Interim Guidelines
differed from the 1995 Guidelines by restoring the Brenner rationale
251
and adding the requirement of “substantial” utility.
The PTO
received comments from seventeen organizations and thirty-five
252
individuals.
Most comments approved of the incorporation of a
“substantial” utility requirement along with the shift toward the
253
It was apparent that the industry
stringent interpretation of utility.
had the same concerns regarding overbroad patent protection for
partial length gene sequences that were expressed ten years earlier,
254
when the NIH filed the first applications for ESTs.
Under the revised Guidelines, a biotechnological invention must
255
possess a “well-established utility.”
This can be established if the
256
utility is “specific, substantial, and credible.”
The standard for
credibility has not varied greatly from the standard set forth in the
257
“Credibility is assessed from the perspective of
1995 Guidelines.
one of ordinary skill in the art in view of the disclosure and any other
258
evidence of record.”
The main difference lies in the “specific” and
259
“substantial” utility prongs of the test.
The scope of a “specific” utility has expanded under the new
260
Guidelines.
Contrary to the liberal standard for “specific” utility
261
adopted in the 1995 Guidelines, an inventor must do more than
262
Under the
clearly assert a particular purpose for the invention.
new Guidelines, the utility must be specific to the claimed subject
263
matter.
This means that an asserted utility as a gene probe, for
example, would only be acceptable if a specific DNA target is

250

Revised Interim Utility Examination Guidelines, 64 Fed. Reg. 71440 (Dec. 21,
1999).
251
Id.
252
Utility Examination Guidelines I, supra note 11, at 1092.
253
Id.
254
See supra note 229.
255
Utility Examination Guidelines I, supra note 11, at 1098.
256
Id.
257
See supra text accompanying note 242; see also Stephen G. Kunin, Written
Description Guidelines and Utility Guidelines, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 77, 97
(2000) (“The revision is not intended to change current PTO practice with regard to
assessing the credibility of any asserted utility.”).
258
Utility Examination Guidelines I, supra note 11, at 1098.
259
See Kunin, supra note 257, at 96-97.
260
Id. at 96-99.
261
See supra text accompanying note 241.
262
See Kunin, supra note 257, at 96-99.
263
See Meigs, supra note 239, at 464.
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264

disclosed.
Similarly, a diagnostic utility would be considered a
specific utility only if a specific disease or condition is likewise
265
disclosed.
Under this standard, generalized utilities, such as the
utilities asserted in Kirk, would be grounds for rejection under section
101.
The last hurdle under the new Guidelines is the “substantial”
utility requirement. Although the PTO does not clearly define
“substantial” utility, the Guidelines suggest that the invention must
266
have a real world use.
The amount of additional research required
to yield an immediate benefit is one factor toward the determination
267
of whether an invention has real world use.
“Throw-away” utilities,
such as the use as ballast or “the use of a complex invention as a
268
By requiring
landfill,” are insufficient to meet this requirement.
the invention to possess a real world benefit, the Supreme Court’s
rationale in Brenner has once again become the standard for utility in
the PTO. If an inventor fails to show “well-established” utility, the
269
patent Examiner would reject the claims under section 101.
Thus,
partial length gene sequences are deemed unpatentable if the
asserted uses for the sequence fall short of the Brenner-like standard
incorporated in the current Guidelines.
C. The Practical Effect of the “Credible, Specific, and Substantial”
Utility Standard
The critical issue regarding the new Guidelines is the actual
effect the raised utility standard has on patent applications. The
Guidelines do not clearly delineate a bright line standard between a
substantial and a non-substantial utility.
Rather, every patent
Examiner is provided with instructions in the form of training
270
materials that assist them in making utility determinations.
For
example, in the Revised Interim Utility Guidelines Training
Materials, the synopsis states, “It is . . . assumed that some ‘utility’ is

264

Id.
Id.
266
See generally Utility Examination Guidelines I, supra note 11, at 1098; see also
Timothy A. Worrall, The 2001 PTO Utility Examination Guidelines and DNA Patents, 16
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 123, 133 (2001) (“[T]he training materials require that a
claimed invention have a substantial utility that defines a ‘real world use.’”) (citing
United States Patent and Trademark Office, Revised Interim Utility Guidelines
Training Materials (Jan. 21, 2000), available at http://www.uspto.gov).
267
See Kunin, supra note 257, at 98.
268
Utility Examination Guidelines I, supra note 11, at 1098.
269
Id.
270
See infra note 271.
265

154

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

Vol. 33:127

disclosed in the specification or is recognized to be well-established in
the art. The Examiner should determine whether any asserted utility
is specific and substantial, and if so, determine whether such asserted
271
utility is credible.”
Actual examples of claim rejections based on
lack of utility under section 101 help to clarify this general
instruction.
In the first example, a patent application claimed specific
nucleic acid compounds which purported to encode a certain type of
272
protein.
During prosecution, the Examiner rejected the claims
because the “nucleic acids [were] not supported by a specific asserted
utility because the disclosed uses of the nucleic acids are not specific
273
and are generally applicable to any nucleic acid.”
Specifically, the
Examiner ultimately arrived at the following conclusion:
[N]o substantial utility has been established for the claimed
subject matter. For example, any nucleic acid can produce a
protein. The protein could then be used in conducting research
to functionally characterize the protein. The need for such
research clearly indicates that the protein and/or function is not
disclosed as to a currently available or substantial utility. A
starting material that can only be used to produce a final product
does not have a substantial asserted utility in those instances
where the final product is not supported by a specific and
274
substantial utility.

In response to the rejection, the applicant asserted that the
275
claimed invention did possess a well-established utility.
The
applicant noted that the claimed sequences comprised certain
functional and structural features, which were intrinsic to the family
276
of genes that encoded this specific class of proteins.
Furthermore,
the applicant stated that the sequences were useful in selecting and
making oligomers for a gene-chip assay which would aid in
277
monitoring
the
expression
levels
of
these
proteins.
Notwithstanding these asserted utilities, the Examiner maintained the

271

Revised Interim Utility Guidelines Training Materials, available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/utility.pdf (last visited Jul. 7, 2002) (on file with
author).
272
Because the case in which this information is taken is still pending, identifying
information has been redacted to preserve confidentiality. The Office Action, dated
January 23, 2001, is on file with the author.
273
Id.
274
Id.
275
Applicant’s response, dated June 25, 2001, is on file with the author.
276
Id.
277
Id.
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278

rejections under section 101.
A similar rejection was sustained in a second patent application
where the claimed invention involved another class of proteins and
279
the polynucleotides encoding them.
The Examiner rejected the
claims because “none of the proteins that are to be produced as final
products resulting from processes involving claimed nucleic acid have
280
asserted or identified specific and substantial utilities.”
Furthermore, the Examiner noted that the “non-specific uses
[asserted] . . . are applicable to proteins in general and [are] not
particular or specific to nucleic acid(s) and/or protein(s) being
281
claimed.”
In response, the applicant indicated specific ways in
282
The applicant noted
which the encoded proteins could be used.
that the novel proteins are capable of inducing biological activities
283
such as bone, cartilage, or connective tissue formation.
The
proteins could also be used for increasing the activity of additional
284
Additionally, the invention
bone morphogenetic proteins.
possesses a well-established utility as a research tool that is used in
characterizing an important class of human proteins with which it
285
shares significant structural and functional similarities.
Thus,
contrary to the Examiner’s basis for rejection, the applicant
illustrated ways in which these utilities would not be shared by any
general protein. Whether these assertions are enough to overcome
the utility rejections is yet to be determined.
IV. LEGAL CHALLENGES TO THE NEW UTILITY GUIDELINES
As the federal agency responsible for the administration of
286
patent laws, the PTO plays a crucial role in the granting of patent
rights for inventions that are truly worthy of protection. The
responsibility of differentiating between patentable and nonpatentable inventions has become a more challenging task due to the
unique nature of gene sequences. It is clear that gene patent
applications must be handled with caution. DNA patentability
278

Id.
Identifying information has been redacted to preserve confidentiality. The
Office Action, dated April 18, 2001, is on file with the author.
280
Id.
281
Id.
282
Applicant’s responses, dated August 20, 2001 and April 11, 2001, are on file
with the author.
283
Id.
284
Id.
285
Id.
286
See 35 U.S.C. § 1(a) (2001).
279
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invokes concerns such as the distortion of research priorities, stifled
scientific research, the potential for increased licensing complexity
287
and costs, and costly ownership disputes.
Undoubtedly,
researchers should be rewarded for their efforts to identify potentially
useful sequences. Because of the implications arising from gene
patents, however, their reward should be commensurate with the
benefit received from the disclosure of the sequence. The raised
utility standard illustrates the PTO’s attempt to resolve these issues.
It is clear that the PTO does not have unfettered discretion on
these matters. The Federal Circuit clearly stated that “[t]he
Guidelines, like the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure
(“MPEP”) are not binding on th[e] court, but may be given judicial
288
notice to the extent they do not conflict with the statute.”
The
PTO is bound by the laws that Congress enacted and the judicial
289
interpretation of such laws.
An analysis of the current state of the
law suggests that the “credible, specific and substantial” utility
standard demands a showing of utility beyond what Congress
intended.
Although the current guidelines may appear to be consistent
with the Supreme Court’s holding in Brenner, the facts of that case
suggest that the Court did not intend to create a raised utility
290
standard that is applicable to all inventions.
Rather, as Judge Rich
noted in his dissent in Kirk, the facts of Brenner must be distinguished
291
In particular,
from other cases addressing the utility requirement.
Brenner involved an interference proceeding where the main issue
focused on Manson’s supporting affidavits which failed to disclose
any utility for the compounds that resulted from his claimed
292
process.
This was distinguishable from the circumstances in Kirk,
where there was “admitted disclosure of utility of the compounds as

287

See Daniel R. Kimball, Patenting Genes: Risks and Rewards vs. Politics and Policies,
available at http://www.cph.com/Publications/patenting_genes.html (last visited
Nov. 18, 2001) (discussing arguments for and against the patenting of ESTs) (on file
with author).
288
Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 296 F.3d 1316, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
289
According to the specific powers enumerated in the Patent Act, the PTO “may
establish regulations, not inconsistent with the law, which shall govern the conduct of
proceedings in the Office.” 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A) (2001).
290
See Kirk, 376 F.2d at 948 (Rich, J., dissenting) (“I cannot believe that the
purpose of the Supreme Court majority in Manson was to decide future issues in
patent law unwittingly, [by] virtue of lower court expansion of its dictum, without
knowing the implications of such decisions.”).
291
Id.
292
Id; see also supra note 141.
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intermediates to make certain steroids.”
Furthermore, decisions by the Federal Circuit in cases following
Brenner articulate a return to the low pre-Brenner utility standard,
which generally posed no obstacle to those seeking patent protection
for their inventions. Thus, it appears that the PTO has arbitrarily
raised the bar for the utility standard, by imposing Guidelines that
adhere to the stringent interpretation of the utility standard when
there is an absence of legislative history suggesting that inventions
must show a higher degree of utility to be patentable.
By judging patent applications against the “specific, substantial,
and credible” utility standard, the PTO is effectively denying patents
to inventions that should receive patent protection. The PTO has
exceeded its authority by rejecting patent applications for inventions
that possess sufficient utility under the current legal standard of
utility and by demanding the “specific, substantial, and credible”
utility under the Guidelines. The PTO is not authorized to engage in
legislative and judicial rulemaking by substituting their judgment for
utility in place of Congress and the judiciary. The ultra vires actions
may cause substantial damage to applicants who wish to share the
benefits of their research, but with the quid pro quo of a patent.
This Comment proposes that the PTO remove the requirement
of a “credible, specific, and substantial” utility. Because the term
“substantial” was used throughout the Brenner decision, the PTO
incorporated “substantial utility” into the Guidelines.
What
constitutes “substantial utility,” however, is a matter that is defined by
the Brenner decision, the legislative history of the utility requirement
294
under section 101, and the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of utility
as discussed in cases following Brenner. Injustice may result when
“substantial” is interpreted to mean a certain degree of utility. As
Judge Rich explained in his dissent in Kirk, section 101 does not
295
require a specific degree of utility for patentability.
Any degree of
utility, and not an absence of utility as was the case in Brenner, would
296
satisfy the requirement.
As a practical matter, much additional
time and expense would be required to reach conclusions as to how a
specific encoded protein would act biologically.

293
294
295
296

Id. at 949.
See infra text accompanying notes 305-09.
Kirk, 376 F.2d at 954.
See infra text accompanying notes 303-04.
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A. Judge Giles S. Rich: A Closer Look at Brenner and the Legislative
History of the Utility Requirement
Given his significant involvement in drafting the 1952 Patent
Act, his longevity on the bench, and his stature as a jurist, significant
attention must be paid to the observations made by Judge Rich in his
dissenting opinion in Kirk, which support a lower standard of utility
297
under section 101.
In its entirety, Judge Rich’s dissenting opinion
articulates rationale for not extending the “substantial” utility
298
Judge Rich began by
requirement beyond the facts of Brenner.
noting that Brenner was factually distinguishable from Kirk, and
299
therefore was not controlling.
In particular, “the distinction which
must be borne in mind is that between some disclosure of utility and
300
none.”
Judge Rich observed that Manson’s patent application and
supporting affidavits did not disclose any utility for the products of
301
This was a significant distinction from the
his claimed process.
patent in Kirk, where there was admitted disclosure of utility for the
compounds, namely as intermediates in the preparation of certain
302
steroids.
Based on the premise accepted by Judge Rich, that “any
degree of utility, however slight, complies with the requirement that
an invention be ‘useful,’” the invention in Kirk should have been
303
found to possess sufficient utility as a chemical intermediate.
This
is distinct from Manson’s invention, which Judge Rich agreed did not
possess sufficient utility, because no utility was asserted for the
304
compounds produced by the claimed process.
Judge Rich continued his analysis by discussing the absence of
305
legislative history in support of the majority’s ruling in Kirk.
He
traced the evolution of the statutes, beginning with the 1790 Patent
306
Act, up to the current statute, the Patent Act of 1952.
He stated
that the identical term “useful” was used in each statute to describe
307
one of the requirements for patentability.
Furthermore, Judge
Rich observed that the term “useful” was consistently interpreted by
courts to mean that “any degree of utility to anybody was legal
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307

Kirk, 376 F.2d at 947-66.
Id.
Id. at 953.
Id. at 948.
Id.
Id. at 949.
Kirk, 376 F.2d at 955.
See generally id. at 948-49.
Id. at 950-55.
Id. at 954.
Id.
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‘utility.’”
Because there was no indication that Congress intended
to change the utility requirement, Judge Rich argued that the
Supreme Court in Brenner did not intend to overturn nearly 200 years
of established law by demanding an assertion of “substantial” utility
309
for all inventions seeking patent protection.
Turning his focus to public policy, Judge Rich criticized the quid
pro quo philosophy relied upon by the majority in support of
310
requiring “substantial” utility for patentability.
Judge Rich
reasoned that “[t]he only quid pro quo demanded by the statute is full
disclosure of a new and unobvious invention which is of some use to
311
someone.”
An invention that lacks utility will ultimately be of little
312
Thus, the public should not be
value to the patent holder.
concerned with the specific degree of utility possessed by the
invention. Judge Rich explained that as a practical matter, the full
extent of utility is often unknown, as uses generally evolve after
313
inventions are disclosed to the public.
Based on this reasoning,
“substantial” utility plays no role in the quid pro quo equation of patent
law. Rather it is disclosure of the invention to the public that the
inventor must exchange for a government-granted monopoly over
the invention.
Judge Rich’s quid pro quo analysis, however, may not be as
persuasive an argument in this context because of the nature of
human genes. In a situation where an inventor is granted a patent
for a minimally useful invention, Judge Rich suggested that the
patent will correspondingly be of minimal value to the inventor
because the patentee generally will not receive any commercial
314
benefit from the public.
This argument holds true for individual,
self-standing inventions, such as those in the mechanical or electrical
arts, because their existence is independent of other potential
inventions.
Such is not always the case, however, with regard to gene
sequences. There are a finite number of genes in the human
315
genome.
Staking claims to portions of the human genome can
have serious ramifications, particularly when the full extent of their

308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315

Id.
Kirk, 376 F.2d at 949.
Id. at 955.
Id.
Id.
See generally id.
Kirk, 376 F.2d at 955.
See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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biological activity is unknown. Patents covering gene sequences that
form a portion of a full gene have the potential of stifling scientific
316
research.
Where their target gene of interest encompasses a
patented sequence, molecular biologists now have to worry about
whether they are infringing on someone’s patent. This concern,
however, must be balanced against the right of an inventor to reap
the benefits of his research in a pioneer field. Utility will always be an
issue when a new class of compounds with unique properties is
discovered. Demanding a higher standard of utility, however, is
unwarranted and penalizes the pioneer industry. Future researchers
will have to tread more lightly in the face of broad pioneering
patents. The fact that later researchers must be more wary is an
insufficient basis for the PTO to substantially modify a key
requirement for patentability. Rather, it suggests that any such action
317
should be undertaken by Congress after an appropriate study.
Alternatively, the issue should be brought to the public’s attention
and opened up for public discussion or debate.

316

Gene patents have been the subject of controversy for many members of the
scientific community. One example is the lawsuit involving the University of
Rochester (“the University”) against the pharmaceutical company, G.D. Searle. See
Regalado, supra note 223. The University claims that Searle’s painkiller drug,
Celebrex, infringes on the patent it holds over the Cox-2 gene. Id. The lawsuit has
been described as a tactical measure by the University to coerce Searle into paying
royalties. Id. If royalties are not paid by Searle, the University demands that the drug
be removed from the market, regardless of the fact that it is used by approximately
seven million arthritis sufferers. Id. Another example is the lawsuit involving the
commercial genetic test for the Canavan disease, a neurological disorder affecting
Ashkenazi Jewish children. See American Medical Association, Gene Patent Leads to
Legal Action, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/3358.html
(last visited Nov. 18, 2001). The Miami Children’s Hospital (MCH) owns a patent
over the gene causing the disease. Id. The lawsuit focuses on the MCH decision to
enforce a licensing fee for every test performed. Id. The lawsuit seeks to prevent
MCH from impeding access and care to affected individuals by imposing financial
restrictions. Id.
Several members of the field expressed the need for reform over gene patents,
including Michael S. Watson, chair of the patent subcommittees of the American
College of Medical Genetics and professor at the Washington University School of
Medicine. See Douglas Steinberg, Biotech Faces Evolving Patent System, THE SCIENTIST
14[5]:8, available at http://www.the-scientist.com (Mar. 6, 2000) (on file with
author). Watson conducted a survey over board-certified professionals in molecular
diagnostics. Id. Based on the responses, forty-one percent felt that patents negatively
impacted training programs, and fifty-four percent stated that they were deterred
from pursuing a scientific interest because of patents. Id.
317
See, e.g., Zuhn, supra note 128, at 996 (noting that in the past “Congress created
separate intellectual property systems for plant varieties and semiconductor chip
masks”).
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B. The Decisions of the Federal Circuit Clearly Articulate a Low
Standard for Utility
Although the Federal Circuit has not specifically ruled on the
degree of utility required for biotechnological inventions, the court
recently articulated in very clear terms the degree of utility required
for inventions generally. In Juicy Whip, the Federal Circuit took the
318
position that “[t]he threshold for utility is not high.”
Rather,
under section 101 of the Patent Act, an invention simply must be
319
Interestingly, while
capable of providing an identifiable benefit.
the Federal Circuit cited Brenner in support of its rationale, the
phrase “substantial” utility is not mentioned at any point in the
opinion.
Although the patent in Juicy Whip involved a type of beverage
dispenser, an invention far from the complexity of biotechnological
inventions, the court’s rationale for finding sufficient utility is
nonetheless applicable to gene patents. The Federal Circuit focused
on the public policy concern of patenting inventions which could be
320
used to defraud or deceive.
The court explicitly rejected the
321
notion that such a possibility could deprive an invention of utility.
The Juicy Whip decision further noted that there are protections in
place to address these concerns, namely administrative agencies such
322
as the FTC and FDA.
Thus, it is outside the province of the
judiciary and the PTO to protect society from such harm by denying
patent protection.
The court concluded that “Congress is free to declare particular
types of inventions unpatentable for a variety of reasons, including
deceptiveness . . . . Until such time as Congress does so, however, we
find no basis in section 101 to hold that inventions can be ruled
323
unpatentable for lack of utility.”
This highly deferential position
afforded to Congress, in combination with the less stringent utility
standard followed by the Federal Circuit in its decisions following
Brenner, make it likely that the PTO is acting in an ultra vires manner
by incorporating a “substantial” utility requirement in its guidelines.
The Federal Circuit has clearly articulated that modification of the
utility standard is a matter that is best addressed by Congress, rather
than by the courts.
318
319
320
321
322
323

Juicy Whip, 185 F.3d at 1366.
Id.
Id. at 1366-68.
Id. at 1367.
Id. at 1368.
Id.
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In the recent Federal Circuit decision, Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen324
Probe Inc.,
the court addressed an analogous patentability issue
relating to the written description requirement under 35 U.S.C. §
325
112. The invention involved nucleic acid probes that were used for
selective hybridization with the genetic material of gonorrhea-causing
326
bacteria.
To fulfill the written description requirement, Enzo
Biochem (“Enzo”) deposited the claimed nucleotide sequences in a
327
public depository. Enzo argued that the reference to the deposit in
the specification inherently described the invention, thereby
328
satisfying the section 112 requirement.
The defendant, however,
argued that this reference was insufficient for purposes of section
329
112, and the patent was thus invalid.
Noting its departure from existing precedent, the court held
that the written description requirement was met. The court
concluded that “reference in the specification to a deposit in a public
depository, which makes its contents accessible to the public when it
is not otherwise available in written form, constitutes an adequate
description of the deposited material sufficient to comply with the
330
written description requirement of section 112, paragraph 1.”
The
court considered the history of the practice of depositing biological
materials, the general goals of the patent system, and the “practical
difficulties of describing unique biological materials in a written
331
description.”
This decision supports the policy argument that can be made in
the case of the utility requirement. By focusing on these factors, the
court placed great weight on the practical considerations associated
with scientific research. Private and public institutions make huge
expenditures to arrive at the discoveries that promote the well-being
of humans. The general goal of promoting the progress of science
324

296 F.3d 1316 (2002).
The written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 states that,
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention,
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full,
clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art
to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make
and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by
the inventor of carrying out his invention.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2001).
326
Enzo, 296 F.3d at 1320.
327
Id. at 1322.
328
Id. at 1325.
329
Id. at 1322.
330
Id. at 1325.
331
Enzo, 296 F.3d at 1325.
325
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can be realistically achieved if researchers are financially stable
enough to continue research efforts. Researchers rely on the
protection granted by patents to proceed with endeavors, some of
which do not produce a profitable result.
The court in Enzo Biochem realized that, although the court may
have previously considered a reference to deposit as insufficient for
purposes of the written description requirement, circumstances exist
in the realm of biotechnological research which justify the opposite
result. What is important is the fact that the public had access to the
claimed materials. Similar circumstances exist with gene sequences.
Although the full utility of the gene sequence may not be known,
scientists rely on patent protection to continue the research that may
ultimately unveil the full utility of the gene. In the meantime, the
information that is known is made available to the public, and the
public is able to partake in similar research efforts with the hopes of
uncovering the gene’s full utility.
C. Proposed Resolution: Utility Analysis for Gene Patents

332

The foregoing analysis discusses three guiding principles that
help define the current law regarding the utility requirement for
patentability. First, the Supreme Court in Brenner clearly articulated
that an invention is deemed to have substantial utility “where specific
333
benefit exists in currently available form.”
Thus, patents should
not issue for inventions that possess no utility at all—such as steroidal
compositions whose homologues, as opposed to the steroid itself,
332

A number of alternative measures have been offered by commentators in the
field. See, e.g., Zuhn, supra note 128, at 995-98 (discussing proposals set forth by
commentators on EST patentability, including the adoption of a per se utility standard
for chemical compounds, the application of copyright laws in place of patent laws for
DNA sequences, the alteration of statutory subject matter categories, and applying a
“prospective” utility requirement). One argument is that Congress should create a
separate intellectual property system for biotechnological inventions, as Congress
once did for two other areas of technology, namely semiconductor chip masks and
plant varieties. See id. at 996. The PTO, however, has suggested that such a need for
a specialized patent law system is unnecessary. See John J. Doll, supra note 42
(arguing that similar concerns over gene patenting were used thirty to forty years ago
with emerging polymer chemistry technology, which developed without the need for
a new form of intellectual property). John J. Doll, Director of Biotechnology for the
PTO, noted that the same patentability analysis must be performed for every patent
application, regardless of the nature of the invention. Id. “In every field of
technology — whether emerging, complex, or competitive — all the conditions for
patentability (such as statutory subject matter, utility, enablement, written
description, novelty, and non-obviousness) must be met before a claim is allowed.”
Id. at 689-90. Thus, there is no need for the creation of an entirely separate system
for DNA sequences applications.
333
Brenner, 383 U.S. at 534-35.
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showed tumor-inhibiting effects in mice. Second, based on the
absence of legislative history suggesting that the utility doctrine
requires a higher standard for utility, an invention need only possess
some type of utility, rather than a specific degree of utility. Third, the
Federal Circuit articulated in its recent decisions that inventions need
only meet a relatively low threshold for utility. Thus, an invention
must be capable of providing only an identifiable benefit to satisfy the
utility requirement of section 101.
The Guidelines for determining adequate utility to be used by
the PTO during prosecution should be based on these three
principles. The current Guidelines have the effect of requiring a
certain degree of utility be present for the claimed sequences. The
language cited in the PTO Training Materials illustrates this concept:
“It is . . . assumed that some ‘utility’ is disclosed in the specification or
is recognized to be well-established in the art. The Examiner should
determine whether any asserted utility is specific and substantial, and
334
if so, determine whether such asserted utility is credible.”
To be in
accordance with the law, a standard which provides that “some
‘utility’ . . . disclosed in the specification” be present should plainly
335
satisfy the requirements under section 101.
By these standards, a
nucleic acid sequence, with a disclosed utility as a research tool for
investigation of a specific family of human proteins, should satisfy the
utility Guidelines. Although later researchers may need to exercise
due care to avoid infringement conflicts, this is always an issue in a
viable patent system. It is not the role of the PTO to police
enforcement of patents.
Rather, the authority to change
fundamental patent standards lies with Congress. Until changes are
made, the PTO is responsible for granting patents for inventions that
meet the patentability requirements enacted by Congress and
interpreted by the courts.
CONCLUSION
It is left to the imagination whether the Framers envisioned the
type of inventions that seek patent protection today. What is known,
however, is that there is a pressing need to determine the proper
standards for granting patents for advances in technology. Little
guidance can be found in the sources of patent law. With the rise of
recombinant DNA technology, inventions composed of DNA
emerged. Common sense indicates that limited monopolies over
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See supra note 271.
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these portions of DNA should be granted only with a fair quid pro quo;
a satisfaction of 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 112, 102, and 103. These sections
of the Patent Act adequately protect the public from inventions that
are not worthy of protection. There is no need to tamper with the
utility standards enunciated by the courts and previously adopted by
the PTO. Without any overt legislative action taken by Congress,
however, the PTO took the initiative of denying patent protection for
biotechnological inventions with identifiable utility by issuing stricter
Utility Examination Guidelines. The PTO essentially raised the utility
hurdle for which an invention must pass. In light of the actual
holding of Brenner, the Federal Circuit decisions following Brenner,
and the congressional silence on the matter, the PTO lacks the
authority to substantially alter one of the fundamental requirements
of patentability. Thus, the PTO is acting outside its scope of authority
by denying patent protection for inventions that do not meet its
raised utility standard.

